![]() The significance of NC3 for nuclear stability and deterrence caught the attention of military planners and scholars alike, especially toward the later phases of the Cold War. Most of those elements are terrestrial others are positioned in space. NC3 comprises the comprehensive network of sensors, communication channels, command-and-control hardware and software, and crews operating them through which nuclear-armed states detect, transmit, and distribute warnings of an impending nuclear strike, make decisions on appropriate response, and issue orders to their own nuclear forces. ![]() This dangerous and destabilizing property of space-to-space operations holds the potential of complicating nuclear-armed states’ endeavor to preserve the coherence of their NC3 – a situation whose negative ramifications on strategic stability could be serious and potentially catastrophic.Īlthough the focus of most analysts and the fascination of the public have largely been on nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, such as ballistic missiles and bombers, equally if not more important is the role played by the nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) architecture and capabilities fielded by states possessing nuclear weapons. Augmenting the potential and attractiveness of space-to-space engagements in anti-satellite role though are the limitations of space situational awareness and the consequent difficulties encountered in prompt and unfailing detection and attribution of space-to-space intrusions. On the downside, the real-life efficiency of space-to-space engagements is subject to important limitations and unknowns. Recent technological advances in so-called proximity operations have rendered such space-to-space engagements more achievable, effective, and attractive. Among the range of options to achieve such destruction or interference are kinetic and non-kinetic attacks executed by other satellites and craft that are themselves positioned in space. Ever since the placing in orbit of the first satellites, state and non-state actors have persistently pursued ways to harm them or to interrupt or compromise their services. Yet high confidence placed in those satellites’ uninterrupted availability is based on shaky grounds and potentially dangerous. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of military and strategic studies and to those with an interest in space strategy in particular.Satellites in Earth’s orbit fulfill important functions in support of NC3 – nuclear command, control, and communication infrastructures of nuclear-armed states. Yet by expanding a naval strategic framework to include maritime activities-which includes the interaction of land and sea-the breadth of issues and concerns regarding space activities and operations can be fully encompassed.Ĭommander John Klein, United States Navy, uses Sir Julian Corbett's maritime strategy as a strategic springboard, while observing the salient lessons of other strategists-including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mao Tse-tung-to show how a space strategy and associated principles of space warfare can be derived to predict concerns, develop ideas, and suggest policy not currently recognized. It examines why both air and naval strategic frameworks actually fail to adequately capture the scope of real-world issues regarding current space operations. Air Force doctrines, the book argues that space-based weapons don't imbue superiority. This new study considers military space strategy within the context of the land and naval strategies of the past.Įxplaining why and how strategists note the similarities of space operations to those of the air and naval forces, this book shows why many such strategies unintentionally lead to overemphasizing the importance of space-based offensive weaponry and technology.Ĭounter to most U.S.
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